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1. A universe with or without a beginning 
Although modern physical cosmology has been able to 
emancipate itself considerably from its philosophical 
predecessors, it is still occupied with some of their 
fundamental questions (cf. Kanitscheider 2002). One of 
them is the problem of the finiteness versus infiniteness of 
time and space. The philosophical implications of current 
scientific approaches to these problems and the Big Bang, 
should they turn out to be true, are far-reaching; and they 
are based on many (partly speculative) premises as well 
as concepts, which are not always sufficiently clear in 
scientific practice. Therefore these approaches are also an 
interesting subject of reflections for philosophers of 
science (cf. Bartels 1996). 
Immanuel Kant (1781/1787), in his Critique of Pure 
Reason, argued that it is possible to prove both that the 
world has a beginning and that it is eternal (First Antinomy 
of Pure Reason, A426f/B454f). As Kant believed he could 
overcome this "self-contradiction of reason" ("Widerspruch 
der Vernunft mit ihr selbst", A740) by the help of what he 
called "transcendental idealism", the question whether the 
cosmos exists forever or not has almost vanished in 
philosophical discussions. This is somewhat surprising, 
because Kant's argument is quite problematic (cf., e.g., 
Heimsoeth 1960, Wilkerson 1976, Smith 1985, Wike 1982, 
Schmucker 1990, Falkenburg 2000). In the twentieth 
century, however, the question became once again vital in 
the context of natural science, culminating in the contro-
versy between Big Bang and Steady State models in 
modern physical cosmology (Kragh 1996). In recent years, 
it has reappeared in the framework of quantum cosmology 
(Vaas 2001b & 2002a), where, on the one hand, there are 
Instanton models that assume an absolute beginning of 
time (Vilenkin 1982 & 1984, Hawking & Hartle 1983, 
Hawking & Turok 1998), while other scenarios suppose 
that the Big Bang of our universe was only a transition 
from an earlier state (Linde 1983 & 1994, Blome & Priester 
1991, Khoury et al. 2001, Steinhardt & Turok 2002), and 
that there are perhaps infinitely many such events.  
General Relativity breaks down at very small spatio-
temporal scales and high energy densities. This is why 
quantum cosmology is needed. But in contrast to the 
framework of General Relativity, which is theoretically well 
understood and has been empirically confirmed quite 
marvelously, the current approaches in quantum cosmol-
ogy, string theory, etc., are still quite speculative, contro-
versial, and almost without any empirical footing yet. 
Although it is on a much more sophisticated and abstract 
level, this situation somewhat resembles the pre-Socratic 
discussions of natural philosophy. This is a further reason 
why conceptual analysis and philosophical investigations 
of assumptions and implications in general might be useful 
here – both within and beyond physics.  
This paper has two goals: First, a conceptual clarification 
of the term "Big Bang" shall be made, drawing a four-fold 
terminological distinction which helps to classify different 
cosmologies and avoid confusion. Second, a proposal for 
a solution of Kant's First Antinomy of Pure Reason within a 
framework of metaphysical realism is suggested, which is 
compatible with some modern cosmological scenarios.  
2. Different notions of "Big Bang" and 
"universe" 
"Big Bang" is an ambiguous term, which has lead to many 
misunderstandings and prejudice. One should draw a 
distinction between at least four logically different 
meanings: (1) the hot, dense early phase of our universe 
where the light elements were formed, (2) the initial 
singularity, (3) an absolute beginning of space, time, and 
energy, and (4) the beginning of our universe, i.e. its 
elementary particles, vacuum state, and perhaps its (local) 
space-time. 
That our universe originated from a Big Bang in the 
sense of (1) is almost uncontroversial. (2) is the relativistic 
cosmology's limit of backward extrapolation where the 
known laws of physics break down. Different models of 
quantum and string cosmology try to overcome this limit, 
and (3) and (4) classify their different scenarios. Those 
characterized by (3) might be called initial cosmologies; 
they postulate a very first moment (cf. Grünbaum 1991, 
Smith 2002). Those characterized by (4) are eternal 
cosmologies; there are different kinds of them – namely 
static, evolutionary (with cumulative change), and 
revolutionary (with sharp phase-transitions) ones – both in 
ancient and in modern cosmology. And they could have 
either a linear or a cyclic time. The option (4) also allows 
the possibility that our universe neither exists eternally, nor 
that it came into being out of nothing or out of a timeless 
state, but that space and time are not fundamental and 
irreducible at all, or that there was a time "before" the Big 
Bang – "Big Bang" in the sense of (1) –, as well as that 
there are other universes. 
There are different meanings of the term „universe“, e.g.: 
(1) Everything (physically) in existence, ever, anywhere; 
(2) the observable region we inhabit (the Hubble volume, 
roughly 27 billion light years in diameter), plus everything 
that has interacted or will ever interact with this region; (3) 
this region plus everything that has interacted with it by 
now, or will at least do so in the next few billion years; (4) 
any gigantic system of causally interacting things that is 
wholly (or to a very large extent) isolated from others; (5) 
any system that might well have become gigantic, etc., 
even if it does in fact recollapse while it is still very small; 
(6) other branches of the wavefunction (if it never 
collapses, cf. Vaas 2001c) in unitary quantum physics, i.e. 
different histories of the universe or classical worlds which 
are in superposition; (7) completely disconnected systems 
consisting of universes in one of the former meanings, 
which do or do not share the same boundary conditions, 
constants, parameters, vacuum states, effective low-
energy laws, or even fundamental laws, e.g. different 
physically realized mathematical structures (cf. Tegmark 
2003). Nowadays, the term „cosmos“ or „multiverse“ or 
„world“ (as a whole) might be used (and will be used here) 
to refer to Everything in Existence, while „universe“ permits 
to talk of several universes within the multiverse. In 
principle, these universes might or might not be spatially, 
temporally, dimensionally, and/or mathematically sepa-
rated from each other. 
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3. A possible solution for Kant's First 
Antinomy 
Kant's First Antinomy makes the error of the excluded third 
option, i.e. it is not impossible that the universe could have 
both a beginning and an eternal past. If some kind of 
metaphysical realism is true, including an observer-
independent and relational time, then a solution of the 
Antinomy is conceivable. It is based on the distinction 
between a microscopic and a macroscopic time scale. 
Only the latter is characterized by an asymmetry of nature 
under a reversal of time, i.e. the property of having a 
global (coarse-grained) evolution – an arrow of time (Zeh 
2001, Vaas 2002b, Albrecht 2003) – or many arrows, if 
they are independent from each other. (Note that some 
might prefer to speak of an arrow in time, but that should 
not matter here.) On the microscopic scale, however, only 
local, statistically distributed events without dynamical 
trends, i.e. a global time-evolution or an increase of 
entropy density, exist – if the system is in thermodynamic 
equilibrium (e.g. there is a huge degeneracy of micro-
scopic states identifiable with the same coarse-grained 
state) and/or in an extremely simple meta-stable ground 
state. Some still speculative theories of quantum gravity 
permit the assumption of such a global, macroscopically 
time-less ground state (e.g. quantum or string vacuum, 
spin networks, twistors). Due to accidental fluctuations, 
which exceed a certain threshold value, universes can 
emerge out of that state. Due to some also speculative 
physical mechanism (like cosmic inflation) they get – and, 
thus, are characterized by – directed non-equilibrium 
dynamics, specific initial conditions, and, hence, an arrow 
of time. (It could be defined, for instance, by the cosmic 
expansion parameter or by the increase of entropy.)  
It is a matter of debate (cf., e.g., Price 1996, Vaas 
2002b) whether such an arrow of time is 1) irreducible, i.e. 
an essential property of time (e.g. Maudlin 2002), 2) 
governed by some unknown fundamental and not only 
phenomenological law (e.g. Penrose 1989, Prigogine 
1979), 3) the effect of specific initial conditions (cf. Albrecht 
2003, Schulman 1997, Zeh 2001) or 4) consciousness (if 
time is in some sense subjective, e.g. Kant 1781/1787) or 
5) even an illusion (e.g. Barbour 2000); many physicists 
favour special initial conditions, though there is no 
consensus about their nature and form. But in the context 
at issue it is sufficient to note that such a macroscopic 
global time-direction is the main ingredient of Kant's First 
Antinomy, for the question is whether this arrow has a 
beginning or not. Surprisingly, quantum cosmology offers a 
possibility that the arrow has a beginning and that it 
nevertheless emerged out of an eternal state without any 
macroscopic time-direction. (Note that there are some 
parallels with a theistic conception of a creation of the 
world here, e.g. in the Augustinian tradition which claims 
that time together with the universe emerged out of a time-
less God; but such a cosmological argument is quite 
controversial, especially in a modern form, cf. Craig & 
Smith 1993, and of course beyond the scope of this 
paper.) So this overcoming of the First Antinomy is not 
only a philosophical possibility but is already motivated by 
modern physics. At least some scenarios of Quantum 
Geometry (Ashtekar 2002) and String Cosmology (Gaspe-
rini & Veneziano 2003, Vaas 2003) can be interpreted as 
examples for such a local beginning of our macroscopic 
time out of a state with microscopic time, but with an 
eternal, global macroscopic timelessness.  
Note that this kind of solution bears some resemblance 
to a possibility of avoiding the spatial part of Kant's First 
Antinomy, i.e. his claimed proof of both an infinite space 
without limits and a finite, limited space: The Theory of 
General Relativity describes what was considered logically 
inconceivable before, namely that there could be universes 
with finite, but unlimited space (Einstein 1917), i.e. this part 
of the Antinomy also makes the error of the excluded third 
option. This offers a middle course between the Scylla of a 
mysterious, secularized "creatio ex nihilo", and the Charyb-
dis of an equally inexplicable eternity of the world. 
In this context it is also possible to defuse some ex-
planatory problems of the origin of "something" (or 
"everything") out of "nothing" as well as a – merely 
assumable, but never provable – eternal cosmos or even 
an infinitely often recurring universe (cf. Nozick 1981 & 
2001, Parfit 1998). But that does not offer a final explana-
tion or a sufficient reason, and it cannot eliminate the 
ultimate contingency of the world.  
4. Outlook 
It seems unlikely that philosophical considerations alone 
can answer the question whether there was a beginning of 
the universe or not, and in what sense. It is also prema-
ture, however, to ignore such questions, e.g. for Kantian 
reasons. On the other hand, it is not to be expected that 
some unambiguous empirical results (e.g. from the 
gravitational wave background, dark matter relics, or some 
traces in the cosmic background radiation) will ever solve 
these questions. But empirical research might at least 
constrain cosmological theories which could and should be 
based on current and/or future and more advanced 
fundamental theories of forces, particles, space and time, 
e.g. M-theory or Quantum Geometry. It is an open ques-
tion whether the dream of such a "final theory" (Weinberg 
1992) or "Theory of Everything" (Barrow 1991) will ulti-
mately explain the origin of our universe (or even the 
whole multiverse) and address the finiteness or infinity of 
space and time – or even reduce space-time to something 
more fundamental. But extrapolating from the scenario of 
eternal inflation (Guth 2000, Vilenkin 2000), and contem-
porary approaches to quantum gravity, it seems almost 
inevitable that the origin of our universe was not a unique 
event, and that other universes also exist (Linde 1994, 
Smolin 1997, Vaas 1998, Tegmark 2003). This not only 
has important implications for observational (or anthropic) 
selection effects (Barrow and Tipler 1986, Kanitscheider 
2001, Vaas 2000) and our place in nature (Knobe, Olum & 
Vilenkin 2003, Vaas 2001a), but also for the question 
whether the whole cosmos or multiverse is past-eternal or 
not (Borde, Guth & Vilenkin 2003). If the proposal of this 
paper is correct, both options could be true in some way.  
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